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On a couple of occasions, I entered interview rooms to find a detainee
chained hand andfoot in a fetal position on the floor, with no chair,food,
or water[] Most times they urinatedor defacated [sic] on themselves, and
had been left therefor 18 or 24 hours or more[] On one occasion, the air
conditioning had been turned down so far and the temperature was so cold
in the room, the barefoot detainee was shaking with from the cold[] When
I asked the MP's [Military Police] what was going on, I was told
interrogatorsfrom the day prior ordered this treatment, and the detainee
was not to be moved[] On another occasion, the A/C had been turned off
This Essay was completed and accepted for publication in September 2007. It will be
published sometime in the early summer of 2008. Although the passage of time will no doubt
require the researcher to update some of the materials used in this Essay, no event has yet
preempted the Author's conclusion. That is, the concerns of the Miranda court retain a
remarkable currency in today's War on Terror where the use of torture by interrogators to extract
information from suspected terrorists has been well-documented. But rather than easing
regulations on interrogations by creating an ad hoc national security court with special
admissibility rules, the United States should treat alleged terrorists as criminals and prosecute
them in federal district courts.
. Westerfield Fellow, Loyola University New Orleans, College of Law; LL.M. with
Distinction, Georgetown University Law Center, 2006; J.D. cum laude, University of Hawai'i,
William S. Richardson School of Law, 2003; B.A., University of California, Berkeley, 1999.
Christina M. Sautter, my colleague in the Westerfield Fellows program, read a draft of this Essay
and provided insightful comments which improved the final version. All errors, however, are my
own.
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making the temperature in the unventilated room probably well over 100
degrees[] The detainee was almost unconscious on the floor, with a pile of
hair next to him[] He had apparently been literally pulling out his own
hair throughout the night[] On another occasion, not only was the
temperature unbearably hot, but extremely loud rap music played in the
room, and had been since the day before, with the detainee chained hand
andfoot in thefetal position on the tilefloor[]
Excerpt of FBI e-mail describingconditions
observed at the Guantdnamo Bay detention camp.'
What are you going to do with these people? The utility of someone like
K.S.M.is,
at most, six months to a year. You exhaust them. Then what? It
would have been better ifwe had executed them.
Tyler Drumheller,former division chieffor the
Directorateof Operations, CIA, Europe.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 ("September 1lth"5),
President George W. Bush has repeatedly vowed to bring terrorists "to
justice."3 The Bush Administration's quest for justice, however, has been
tainted with recurring allegations of torture. Torture is illegal under U.S.
and international law, and although the administration denies that the
United States tortures its captives in the War on Terror,4 in 2006, President
Bush announced his approval of the Central Intelligence Agency's ("CIA")
use of an "alternative set of procedures" to extract intelligence information
from terror suspects.'
These alternatives included beatings, extreme

1. Declassified FBI E-mail, Subject: RE GTMO, http://www.americantorture.com/docu
ments/gitmo/12.pdf (Aug. 2, 2004, 10:46 AM).
2. Jane Mayer, The Black Sites: A Rare Look Inside the C.I.A. 's Secret Interrogation
Program,THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 13, 2007, at 50.

3. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of the Congress on the
United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. DOC.
1347 (Sept. 20, 2001); President George W. Bush, U.S. President Remarks on Departure for
Camp David, Maryland, and an Exchange with Reporters, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. DOC. 613,

614 (May 16, 2003).
4. President George W. Bush, U.S. President Remarks on Signing the Military
Commissions Act of 2006, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1831, 1832 (Oct. 17, 2006) ("As I've

said before, the United States does not torture."); Condoleeza Rice, U.S. Sec'y of State, Remarks
En Route to Germany (Dec. 5, 2005), http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/57643.htm ("The
United States does not permit, tolerate, or condone torture under any circumstances.").
5. President George W. Bush, U.S. President, Remarks on the War on Terror, 42 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 1569, 1571 (Sept. 6, 2006) [hereinafter Bush Press Conference Transcript].
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isolation, hooding, mock executions, use of dogs, sleep deprivation, and
waterboarding. 6
In addition to raising doubts about the fairness and legitimacy of the
U.S. detainee policies, torturing suspected terrorists poses the more
immediate problem of, as former CIA chief of European operations Tyler
Drumheller phrased it: "[w]hat are you going to do with these people? ' 7 If
a detainee is prosecuted, the accused will argue that his confession and any
corroborating evidence elicited through torture should be excluded. 8
Consequently, CIA interrogators have little incentive to keep terror
suspects alive after their intelligence value has been exhausted. 9 Moreover,
a living victim of CIA interrogation methods is a prospective witness in the
potential criminal prosecution of the CIA agent who performed the
interrogation."
The fear of prosecution for violating federal torture
statutes is so real for CIA interrogators that many of them have purchased
professional liability insurance to offset the costs of any legal fees
associated with their criminal defense. " For any agent, a tempting solution
is "the disposal plan," a euphemism for the extrajudicial killing of terror
suspects. 12

On July 20, 2007, President Bush signed an executive order announcing that the CIA's
interrogation and detention program would continue under the constraints of the Executive's
interpretation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Press Release, Office of the
Press
Secretary,
President
Bush
Signs
Executive
Order
(July
20,
2007),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/07/20070720-5.html.
The Executive Order
grants White House approval to the CIA's program, explicitly prohibiting acts "comparable to
murder, torture, mutilation, and other cruel or inhuman treatment ....
Exec. Order No. 13,440,
72 Fed. Reg. 40,707§ 3(b)(i)(C) (July 24, 2007). The actual CIA interrogation guidelines,
however, remained classified. Karen DeYoung, Bush Approves New CIA Methods, WASH. POST,
July 21, 2007, at Al.
6. Posting of Marty Lederman to Balkinization, The CIA's "AlternativeSet of Procedures:"
Calling Things by Their Right Names, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/09/cias-altemative-set-ofprocedures.html (Sept. 6, 2006 11:11 PM); Dana Priest, Officials Relieved Secret is Shared,
WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2006, at A17.
7. Mayer, supra note 2.
8. See Josh Meyer, FBI works to bolster case on Al Qaeda, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2007, at
Al. All available sources indicate that each of the detainees at the U.S. Naval Station at
GuantAnamo Bay is male. See generally American Civil Liberties Union, Autopsy reports reveal
homicides
of detainees
in
U.S. custody,
Oct.
24,
2005,
available at
http://action.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/102405/.
9. See generally American Civil Liberties Union, US. Operatives Killed DetaineesDuring
Interrogations in Afghanistan and Iraq, Oct. 24, 2005, available at http://www.aclu.org/
intlhumanrights/gen/21236prs20051024.html.
10. See Mayer, supra note 2.
11. Id.
12. Id. Mayer reports CIA officials voiced objections to the Executive's plan to hoist
detention and interrogation duties on the CIA, an agency which "had virtually no trained
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Six years have passed since President Bush signed the military order
authorizing trials of non-citizen terrorists in military commissions, 3 but
only ten detainees out of the 355 remaining at the U.S. Naval Station at
Guantdnamo Bay ("Guantdinamo") have been charged.14 David Hicks, the
first of those detainees, agreed to a guilty plea which allowed him to return
to his native Australia to serve nine months of a suspended sentence.' 5
Charges against two others have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,16
and the Defense Department has not announced when commissions for the
seven others will convene.
The hundreds of remaining detainees
foreseeably could be held in preventative detention for years without being
charged with a crime.' 7 Clearly, the government's record in prosecuting
the accused, reputed to be "the worst of the worst," has been
disappointing.' 8 Perhaps out of frustration with this entire sordid state of
affairs, some lawyers and legal scholars have recently proposed that the
United States invent a new court, one specifically tasked with bringing
terrorists to justice. '9 The specifics of each proposal for a new court differ

interrogators." Id. Tyler Drumheller, a former chief of European operations, explained: "the
problem from the start ...was that no one had thought through.. . 'the disposal plan."' Id.
13. See generally Military Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in
the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57, 833 (Nov. 16, 2001) [hereinafter Military Order].
14. Bush Press Conference Transcript, supra note 5.
Since September 11, 2001,
Guantdnamo has hosted some 770 detainees. Id.
15. News Release, U.S. Dept. of Defense, Detainee Convicted of Terrorism Charge at
Guantinamo Trial (Mar. 30, 2007), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/
release.aspx?releaseid-10678 [hereinafter Department of Defense News Release]. See also infra
Part II.A.2.
16. See also infra Part II.A.2.
17. Id.
18. Speaking at the Pentagon in January 2002, Rear Admiral John D. Stufflebeem described
the detainees under U.S. control thusly: "They are bad guys. They are the worst of the worst, and
if left out on the street, they will go back to the proclivity of trying to kill Americans and others."
Linda D. Kozaryn, U.S. Gains Custody of More Detainees, American Forces Press Service (Jan.
28, 2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=43813.
See also
Neil A. Lewis & Eric Schmitt, Cuba Detentions May Last Years, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2004, at
Al [hereinafter Lewis & Schmitt] (quoting defense and military officials who insist that
Guantdnamo detainees are "the worst of the worst"). Similarly, in a 2006 press conference
announcing the bill that became the Military Commissions Act of 2006, President Bush declared:
It's important for Americans and others across the world to understand the kind of
people held at Guantnamo.
These aren't common criminals, or bystanders
accidentally swept up on the battlefield .. . . Those held at Guanthnamo include
suspected bomb makers, terrorist trainers, recruiters and facilitators, and potential
suicide bombers. They are held in our custody so they cannot murder our people.
Bush Press Conference Transcript, supra note 5.
19. See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, The Terrorists' Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 11,
2007, at At9 [hereinafter Goldsmith & Katyal]; Glenn Sulmasy, The National Security Court: A
Natural Evolution, JURIST, May 10, 2006 http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2006/05/nationalsecurity-court-natural.php; Glenn Sulmasy, Momentum for a National Security Court, JURIST,
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somewhat, but they all conclude that trying suspected terrorists under the
regular criminal justice system in the U.S. federal courts is an
unsatisfactory option.2"
This Essay will show that the creation of an exceptional ad hoc court
for the purpose of trying suspected terrorists in the United States would be
a misguided approach to solving the problem of the military commissions.
It will also demonstrate that, in a society based on the rule of law, the
justice which President Bush seeks for terrorists must include proper
treatment in detention and fair trials. The regular criminal justice process
in the federal courts has served and can continue to serve as an adequate,
efficient, and fair method to bring terrorists to justice. Moreover, the
exclusionary rule doctrine available to defendants in criminal courts may
provide due process protections and curb torturous interrogation practices.
Part II presents three of the problems the United States currently faces
in its quest to bring suspected terrorists to justice. First, the military
commissions, the current regime for trying detainees at Guantdnamo, has
failed. It will describe the military commissions' regime as it currently
operates, or rather, as it would operate if it ever reconvenes. Because
detainee litigation and subsequent remedial legislation have affected the
operations of the military commissions, this Part discusses the relevant
Supreme Court cases and also describes the relevant provisions of the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 ("DTA") and the Military Commissions
Act of 2006 ("MCA"). Second, the ad hoc court, which some propose as
an alternative to the military commissions, will not be seen as fair or
legitimate. In part, this is because the ad hoc court likely would admit
evidence obtained through torturous interrogation practices. Third, and
finally, the torture of terror suspects by agents of the United States creates
perverse incentives to dispose of suspects by killing them, consequently
making them unavailable to stand trial in any venue.

July
13,
2007,
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/07/momentum-for-national-securitycourt.php; Glenn Sulmasy, The Legal Landscape After Hamdan: The Creation of Homeland
Security Courts, 13 NEW ENG. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (2006); Andrew McCarthy, Abu Ghraib &
Enemy Combatants: An Opportunity to Draw Good Out of Evil, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE,
May
11,
2004,
available
at
http://www.nationalreview.com/mccarthy/mccarthy
200405110832.asp; Andrew C. McCarthy & Alykhan Velshi, We Need a National Security
Court, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, July 15, 2007, http://www.defenddemocracy.org/
usrdoc/ NationalSecurityCourt.doc [hereinafter McCarthy & Velshi].
20. See, e.g., Goldsmith & Katyal, supra note 19; Sulmasy, Momentum, supra note 19;
Sulmasy, supra note 19 at 10. Commentators have suggested a variety of terms for the proposed
court, including the terrorists' court, the national security court, and the homeland security court.
I use these names interchangeably throughout this Essay.

HeinOnline -- 20 St. Thomas L. Rev. 159 2007-2008

ST. THOMAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20

Part III will show that the military commission scheme is deeply
flawed, and the creation of an ad hoc court to try suspected terrorists will
not provide the remedies sought, efficient, fair trials for the accused, and a
legitimate system for preventative detention. Only regularly-constituted
criminal courts, such as the federal district courts, can provide due process
protections for the accused. Finally, this Essay will conclude that justice
and fairness demand individuals accused of terrorism crimes must be
treated as criminals and tried in regular criminal courts.
II. BRINGING SUSPECTED TERRORISTS TO JUSTICE
A. THE FAILURES OF THE MILITARY COMMISSION

1. The Military Order
On November 13, 2001, President Bush signed a Military Order ("the
Order") authorizing certain non-citizen terrorist suspects be tried in military
commissions." Under the Order, suspected members of al Qaeda were "to
be detained, and, when tried, tried for violations of the laws of war and
other applicable laws by military tribunals. 22 Warning of the probability
of further terrorist attacks against the United States, President Bush
declared "an extraordinary emergency exists" and "issuance of this order is
23
necessary to meet the emergency.
Furthermore, the Order established "it is not practicable to apply...
the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the
trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts. 24 The President
delegated authority to prescribe procedural and evidentiary rules for the
military commissions to the Secretary of Defense. 25 The Order, however,
set a specific baseline for the standard of admissibility for evidence. Any
evidence that "would have probative value to a reasonable person" could be
admitted to the trial proceedings, a significantly lower standard than
applied in U.S. district courts or in courts-martial. 26

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See generallyMilitary Order, 60 Fed. Reg. 57,833.
Id.
Id.at 57,833-34.
Id. at 57,833.
Id. at 57,834.
Id. at 57,835.
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2. Judicial Review and Attempts at Remedial Legislation

The original designs for the military commissions under the Order
were modified substantially after Guantdnamo detainees won key victories
in the Supreme Court. In the first of these cases, Rasul v. Bush, z7 the Court
held that federal courts have jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed by

aliens held at Guantdnamo under the federal habeas corpus statute.2"
Congress responded to the Rasul ruling by promulgating the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 ("DTA"), a legislative effort to strip the federal
courts of jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions filed by Guantdtnamo

detainees.29 Under new provisions in the DTA, instead of habeas petitions,
detainees were entitled to receive Combatant Status Review Tribunals
("CSRTs") to determine whether they were being held properly as "enemy
combatants."3 °
A 2004 CSRT found Salim Ahmed Hamdan, Osama bin Laden's

personal driver, was an enemy combatant. 3' The Appointing Authority
charged him with conspiracy to commit terrorism 3 2 and convened a
military commission for his trial.33 Before the commission could get under
way, Hamdan's habeas petition reached the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 34 dealt another
blow to the Executive's military commissions' scheme. In Hamdan, the
Supreme Court rejected the Government's argument the DTA divested

federal courts of jurisdiction for habeas actions pending before the DTA
27. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq. (2006).
29. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2680 (2005).
30. § 1005, 119 Stat. at 2742. The Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) completed
their initial mandate in March 2005. Kathleen T. Rhem, 38 GuantnamoDetainees to be Freed
After Tribunals, AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE (Mar. 30, 2005), available at
Of 520 detainees, thirty-eight
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/mar2005/20050330_368.htm.
were found not to be enemy combatants and were released. Id. (quoting Navy Secretary Gordon
England). On August 9, 2007, the Pentagon announced fourteen more detainees, including
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, have been deemed "enemy combatants" by CSRTs. Josh White,
Detainees Ruled Enemy Combatants, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2007, at A2.
31. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2761 (2006). See also United States v. Hamdan,
Corrected Order, June 4, 2007, at 1-2, para. 5, available at http://www.nimj.org/documents/
Corrected%200rder%20US%20v%20Hamdan.pdf [hereinafter Hamdan Order].
32. The unsigned charging document contained allegations that Hamdan:
willfully and knowingly joined an enterprise of persons who shared a common
criminal purpose and conspired and agreed with [named members of al Qaeda] to
commit the following offenses triable by military commission: attacking civilians;
attacking civilian objects; murder by an unprivileged belligerent; and terrorism.
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2761.
33. Id. at 2761-62.
34. See generally id., 126 S.Ct. 2749.
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was enacted, and therefore undertook certiorari review of Hamdan's habeas
petition.35 Citing Ex Parte Milligan,36 the Court explained even during
times of war, the President's power to convene military commissions is
subject to Congress' specific authorization and these are the separate roles
for the respective political branches envisioned by the Constitution. 37 The
Court held neither the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force38
("AUMF") nor the DTA provides the specific congressional authorization
necessary to legitimize the military commission.3 9 When, as in this case,
Congress had not sanctioned the tribunals, the courts must decide whether
the military commissions are justified by "a controlling necessity."4 The
Court concluded the President had not successfully demonstrated that
requisite military necessity existed. 4
A major concern of the Hamdan court was the military commissions
would operate under a separate set of rules and procedures, significantly
different from both civilian criminal justice and military justice
paradigms.42 The Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ") requires
military commissions to comply with the U.S. common law of war, the
UCMJ itself, and with the "rules and precepts of the law of nations,"
including the four Geneva Conventions. 43 Article 36(b) of the UCMJ
provides whether or not military commission rules conform with the
44
Federal Rules of Evidence, they must be "uniform insofar as practicable."
In Hamdan, the Court acknowledged the principle of uniformity was not
rigid, but read the UCMJ to require proof from the Executive it was
"impracticable" to apply the same rules in military commissions as are
applied in courts-martial.45
Hamdan argued the military commission rules deviated from the
admissibility and relevance rules applicable in both criminal and courtmartial proceedings, and were, therefore, illegal.46 For example, under

35. Id. at 2764-69. The provisions of the DTA went into effect on December 20, 2005. §
1005(h)(1), 119 Stat. at 2680, 2743.
36. 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
37. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2773-74.
38. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
39. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774-75.
40. See id. at 2773-74 (quoting Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 139-40).
41. See id. at 2785-86.
42. See id. at 2830.
43. See id. at 2786.
44. See id. at 2791 (quoting Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §836(b))(emphasis
omitted).
45. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2790.
46. See id. at 2787.
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Commission Order No. 1, which set forth the procedures for commissions
prior to the Manual for Military Commissions ("MMC"), Hamdan could
have been convicted on secret evidence and on evidence that would not
meet the standards for admissibility in a court-martial.4 7 Dismissing the
Government's argument that it should abstain from considering Hamdan's
argument,48 the Court concluded that nothing in the record demonstrated
there would be "any logistical difficulty in securing properly swom and
authenticated evidence or in applying the usual principles of relevance and
admissibility. ' 49 While the Court deferred to the President's determination
it was impracticable to apply the rules and procedures of civilian criminal
law,5" the Court held the Executive had not demonstrated it would be
impracticable to apply the rules for courts-martial. 5
As an additional but independent basis for its ruling in Hamdan, the
Court held the military commissions did not comply with the Geneva
Conventions.5 2 While the majority did not tackle the justiciability issue, 5it3
held that Common Article 3 of the Conventions applied regardless.
Common Article 3 provides that in a "conflict not of an international
character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,
each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum," certain
provisions protecting "[p]ersons . . . placed hors de combat by . . .
detention."54 The Court further held the Geneva Conventions prohibit "the
passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the
judicial guarantees recognized as indispensable by civilized people." 55
Although the Geneva Conventions do not provide a definition of "a
regularly constituted court," a treatise on international humanitarian law by
the International Committee for the Red Cross ("ICRC") explains a
regularly constituted court means one that is "established and organized in
47. See id.
48. See id.at 2787-88.
49. See id. at 2792.
50. See id. at 2791 (citing Military Order, supra note 13).
51. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2792. The rules regulating relevance and admissibility in courtsmartial and in U.S. district courts are cognates. Id. at 2795. Compare FED. R. EVID. and Manual
for Courts-Martial, United States, 2005, Rules for Courts-Martial. The Hamdan Court noted:
"[t]he only reason offered in support of [the impracticability determination] is the danger posed
by international terrorism. Without for one moment underestimating that danger, it is not evident
to us why it should require, in the case of Hamdan's trial, any variance from the rules that govern
courts-martial." Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2792 (footnote omitted).
52. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2793.
53. Id. at 2795.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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accordance with the laws and procedures already in force in a country." 56
The Hamdan decision had the immediate effect of suspending all cases
before the military commissions.57
On September 6, 2006, President Bush sent a bill to Congress to
authorize the creation of military commissions. 8 Congress eventually
approved a version of the bill that became the Military Commissions Act of
2006 ("MCA") and it was signed into law on October 17, 2006."9 The
MCA asserted Guantdnamo detainees only had a statutory right of habeas,
In promulgating the MCA, Congress
which the MCA withdrew.60
purportedly disempowered federal courts from hearing all pending and
future habeas petitions filed by detainees. 6 '
Therefore, after five years of delays, charges in the cases of ten
detainees from Guantdnamo finally were referred to the military
commissions for trial.62 The Government's record in prosecuting the
accused, reputed to be "the worst of the worst," however, proved to be
disappointing. 63 The first charges were brought in February 2007 against
David Hicks, an Australian citizen.64 The Government initially charged
56. Id. at 2797 (quoting INT'L COMM. RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 355 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005)).
57. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2799.
58. President George W. Bush, Message to the Congress of the United States, Sept. 6, 2006,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060906-4.html.
59. The Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified at 10
U.S.C. §§ 948a-950w and other sections of titles 10, 18, 28, and 42).
60. Military Commissions Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2441(a) amends 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e). The new
subsection (e) provides:
(1) No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an
application for writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the
United States who has been determined by the United States to have been properly
detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.
(2) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 1005(e) of the [DTA], no
court justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider any other action
against the United States or its agents relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer,
treatment, trial, or condition of confinement of an alien who is or was detained by the
United States and has been determined by the United States to have been properly
detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.
Id.
This amendment applies retroactively to "any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or
conditions of detention of an alien detained by the United States since September 11, 2001" and
became effective on October 17, 2006. 28 U.S.C. § 2441(b).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 2441(a).
62. U.S. Dep't of Defense, Military Commissions, Commissions Cases, http://www.defense
link.mil/news/commissionsarchives.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2007).
63. See Lewis & Schmitt, supra note 18.
64. United States v. Hicks, Charges, MC Form 458 at 3 (Feb. 2, 2007), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/d2007Hicks%20-%20Notification%2Oof/20Swom%20Charge
s.pdf
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Hicks with attempted murder in violation of the law of war and providing
material support for terrorism.65 In the end, Hicks plead guilty to one
charge of providing material support for terrorism, received a suspended
sentence of seven years, and returned to Australia to serve the remaining
nine months of his sentence.66
The dismissal of charges against the next two detainees, Omar Ahmed
Khadr67 and Salim Ahmed Hamdan, 6s demonstrates the procedures under
the MCA for referring charges from CSRTs to the military commissions
contain serious defects. In both cases, military judges found the military
commissions lacked jurisdiction over the accused and dismissed the
charges without prejudice.69 In Hamdan's case, a 2004 CSRT had
determined he was "a part of or associated with al-Qaeda forces," and
therefore was "properly detained as an 'enemy combatant."' 7
When
Hamdan's case was referred to military commission, however, the military
judge ruled under the MCA, military commissions have jurisdiction to try
offenses only when committed by an "alien unlawful enemy combatant."'"
In granting Hamdan's motion to dismiss all charges, the military judge
reasoned the 2004 CSRT determination was made for the sole purpose of
ascertaining whether his detention was proper, not to qualify him to stand
trial by military commission.7" The distinction is important because the
standards used by the CSRT to determine "enemy combatant" status is
"less exacting" than the definition of "unlawful enemy combatant"
provided by the MCA.73
The series of events described above highlights the distinction
between military and civilian modes of justice some critics have suggested
are insufficient models to try suspected terrorists. For these critics, the
criminal justice paradigm is a poor fit for accused terrorists. Formal federal
prosecutor and legal commentator Andrew McCarthy argues: "Here the
executive is not enforcing American law against a suspected criminal but
exercising national defense powers to protect the nation against external
65. Id.
66.

Department of Defense News Release, supra note 15.
67.United States v. Khadr, Order on Jurisdiction (June 4, 2007), available at
http://www.nimj.org/documents/Khadr/200rder/ 20on%2OJurisdiction.pdf.
68. This is the same petitioner in Hamdan, discussed above. See Hamdan Order, supra note

31.
69. Khadr, Order on Jurisdiction, supra note 68, at para. 3; Hamdan Order, supra note 31, at
4.
70. Hamdan Order, supra note 31, at 1, para. 5.
71. Id. at 2, para. 1 (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 3, para. 1.

73. Id. at 3, para. 2.
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threats."74 Instead of dealing with the constraints on prosecution associated
with U.S. district courts, some argue a new court, one with special rules
and procedures tailor made to meet the unique logistical problems posed by
prosecuting terrorists, should be created to replace the failed military
commission scheme.
B. THE AD Hoc COURT OPTION
Most would agree the current methods for detaining and trying
suspected terrorists is unsatisfactory. Of the ten detainee cases referred
from CRSTs to the military commissions, only one case has been
adjudicated and hundreds more are still detained at Guantdnamo without
charges.7 5 Commentators from the United States and abroad have
criticized this system of indefinite detention as unfair, inefficient, and
violative of international law. 76 Certainly, the moment to address the
shortcomings of the military commissions and indefinite detention scheme
and to proffer solutions is now. Many commentators in the legal
community have risen to the challenge and have concluded the answer to
the problem of the military commissions is the creation of a new homeland
security court.
For the purposes of this discussion, it is helpful to first identify the
various goals to be achieved by the creation of an ad hoc national security
court. The primary goal is replacing the failed military commission
system, but advocates of such an approach also seem concerned with
establishing a universally-recognized, legitimate means of processing,
prosecuting, and punishing individuals accused of terrorism.77 Indeed,
proponents often cite winning international support for the United State's
war effort as a justification for the creation of such a court.7" Professor
Glenn Sulmasy foresees: "Creating a homeland security court system will
74. McCarthy & Velshi, supra note 19 at 7-8.
75. Rhem, supra note 30.
76. See, e.g., Jennifer Van Bergen, Bush's Military Commissions Act and the Future of

America, COUNTERPUNCH, (Oct. 14-15, 2006), available at http://www.counterpunch.org/
vanbergen 10142006.html (criticizing the prospect under the military commission system, that the
Executive could wield open-ended authority to detain suspected terrorists); Press Release, United
Nations, UN Expert on Human Rights and Counter Terrorism Concerned that Military
Commission
Act
is
Now
Law
in
United
States
(Oct.
27,
2006)
http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/hurcane.nsf/view01/13A2242628618D 12C12572140030A8D9?o
pendocument (reporting UN Special Rapporteur Martin Schenin's conclusion that the MCA
"appear[s] to contradict the universal and fundamental principles of fair trial standards and due
process").
77.

Sulmasy, After Hamdan,supra note 19, at 12.

78. Id. at 2.
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enable us to adequately fight the war, maintain international support, and
continue to display our resolve to hold up the rule of law."79 Professors
Jack L. Goldsmith and Neal Katyal echo these sentiments: "the
government's system of detaining terrorists without charge or trial has
harmed the reputation of the United States, disrupted alliances, hurt us in
the war of ideas with the Islamic world[,] and has been viewed skeptically
by our own courts."8 The objectives cited above, legitimacy and justice,
are laudable. The means they have proposed utilizing to achieve those
goals, however, are incompatible with the rule of law.
These
commentators have concluded the only answer to the quagmire that is the
military commission scheme is to invent a new court, one specially
designed to try terrorists free from the burdens of constitutional due process
rights.8
For example, the ad hoc court could allow the Government to
introduce evidence obtained through torturous interrogation practices.
Although no proponent of a new terrorist court has furnished any specific
details regarding what standards of admissibility for evidence would apply
in that court, it is reasonable to assume the standards for the new court
would be less strict than the federal rules and not more strict than the rules
set forth under the Manual for Military Commissions ("MMC"); the MMC
sets a low bar.
The MCA amended the UCMJ to establish procedural and evidentiary
rules for trials under the military commissions.82 In January 2007, the
Secretary of Defense submitted the MMC to Congress, which contains the
Military Commissions Rules of Evidence.83
Rule 304(a) provides
generally that statements obtained by use of torture shall not be admitted
into evidence against any party.84 This general rule is subject to a
significant exception in Rule 304(c), which contemplates admission of
torture evidence "[w]hen the degree of coercion inherent in the production
of a statement ... is disputed."85 In summary, although evidence obtained
by torture specifically is excluded from such trials, if the totality of the
79. Id. at 3.
80. Goldsmith & Katyal, supra note 19.
81. See generally McCarthy & Velshi, supra note 19. "[This new tribunal] would inject
judicial participation into the process to promote procedural integrity and international
cooperation, but would avoid the perilous prospect of judicial micromanagement of the executive
branch's war on terror." Id. at 2.
82. R. Jeffrey Smith, Pentagon Releases Rules for Trials of Terrorism Suspects, WASH.
POST, Jan. 19, 2007, at A13.
83. Id.
84. MIL. COMM'N R. EvID. 304(a).
85. MIL. COMM'N R. EVID. 304(c).
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circumstances renders statements obtained by coercion reliable and
probative in the judgment of the Military Judge, they may be admitted.86
The proponents of the ad hoc court have proposed a series of alarming
departures from the minimum requirements for due process longrecognized in this country.87 These proposed changes indicate the rules of
the ad hoc court will be designed to follow the trend towards weakening
procedural protections for terror suspects set by the military commission
system. This problem is exacerbated by the United State's continued use of
torture as an interrogation method.
C. TORTURE AND THE "DISPOSAL PLAN"

Although torture is illegal under both U.S. and international law, the
United States has a long history of using torture to achieve intelligence
goals. In his book, A Question of Torture, History Professor Alfred W.
McCoy documents the last fifty years in the CIA's experiments with
torture.88 Professor McCoy traces the roots of the abuses recorded at Abu
Ghraib prison to CIA interrogation practices dating back to at least the
Cold War era. 89 The physically and psychologically coercive interrogation
techniques the CIA uses on torture suspects violates the absolute
prohibition on torture enshrined in domestic and international law.9"

86. The Manual for Military Commissions, pt. I, § 1(g). provides:
Statements obtained by torture are not admissible (10 U.S.C. §948r(b)), but
statements 'in which the degree of coercion is disputed' may be admitted if reliable,
probative, and the admission would best serve the interests of justice (10 U.S.C.
§948r(c)). In addition, for such statements obtained after December 30, 2005, the
methods used to obtain those statements must comply with the [DTA], enacted on that
date (10 U.S.C. §948r(d)(3)).
U.S. Dep't of Defense, Manual for Military Commissions, pt. I, § 1(g) (2007), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/The%20 Manual%20for/o20Commissions.pdf.
87. These include suggestions that the standard of admissibility for evidence be relaxed, the
Government's duty to provide exculpatory evidence to the accused be eliminated, and the burden
of proof be lowered. See Goldsmith & Katyal, supra note 19 (suggesting the standards for
admitting evidence should be less stringent than those required by the Federal Rules of
Evidence); McCarthy, supra note 19 (arguing the government's duty to provide exculpatory
evidence to the accused be narrowed or eliminated altogether and advocating that, instead of the
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt burden, the government should only be required to prove its
allegations by a preponderance of the evidence).
88. See generally ALFRED W. MCCOY, A QUESTION OF TORTURE: CIA INTERROGATION,
FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE WAR ON TERROR (Metropolitan Books 2006).

89. Id. at 5-7.
90. See generally id. (discussing the physical and psychological torture methods used on
detainees). See United Nations Convention Against Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/708 (1984),
reprintedin 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984).
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The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution forbids "cruel and
unusual punishment" in the United States.9 In the international arena, the
1984 United Nations Convention Against Torture ("CAT"), which the
United States ratified on October 21, 1994, specifically prohibits torture.92
In its 1999 report to the United Nations Committee Against Torture, the
State Department averred:
Every act of torture within the meaning of the Convention is illegal
under existing federal and state law, and any individual who commits
such an act is subject to penal sanction as specified in criminal statutes.
Torture cannot be justified by exceptional circumstances,93 nor can it be
excused on the basis of an order from a superior officer.
For example, the federal torture statute, which implements U.S.
obligations under CAT, criminalizes torture, attempted torture, and
conspiracy to torture. 94 Anyone prosecuted under the torture statute is
subject to fines or imprisonment for up to twenty years. 95 The statute
provides the perpetrator shall be sentenced to life in prison or death, if the
victim dies from the torture. 96
Other federal statutes provide for the criminal prosecution of military
service members and military contractors accused of torture. The UCMJ
explicitly criminalizes torture and provides military personnel who abuse
prisoners can be prosecuted by a court-martial.9 7
The Military

91. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
92. Article I of CAT, provides in relevant part:
Any act which by severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third
person information or a confession . . . or intimidating or coercing . . . when such
pain or suffering is inflicted ... with the consent or acquiescence of a public official.
Convention Against Torture, supra note 90, at art. 1.
93. U.S. Dep't of State, Initial Report of the United States to the United Nations Committee
Against Torture (Oct. 15, 1999) available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/humanrights/
torture_index.html. See also Torture Victims Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-256, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 (furnishing a tort remedy for torture victims).
94. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(a) (2007). Section 2340 of the U.S. Code defines torture as "an act
committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe
physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incident to lawful sanctions)
upon another person within his custody or physical control." 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1) (2007).
"Severe mental pain or suffering" is further defined as the "prolonged mental harm caused by or
resulting from (A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or
suffering; (B) the administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of
mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or
personality." Id. at § 2340(2)(A-B).
95. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(a).
96. Id.
97. See generally Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2007).
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Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 200098 provides military personnel and
contractors working for the Department of Defense may be prosecuted in
U.S. district courts for certain felony offenses, including torture committed
abroad while employed by or accompanying U.S. forces overseas.99 Other
nations have adopted similar laws criminalizing torture and providing for
the prosecution of offenders.' 00 Many legal commentators and jurists agree
the prohibition against torture now has become a peremptory norm of
international human rights and humanitarian law from which no derogation
is allowed. Ol
The September 1 1th attacks, however, furnished visceral incentives for
lawyers in the Justice Department to launch a legal assault against the
unqualified prohibition against torture. In early 2002, Jay Bybee wrote a
memo to former White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales effectively redefining torture to provide legal justification for the use of more severe
interrogation techniques against terror suspects.1 2 The memo began by
concluding "certain acts may be cruel, inhuman, or degrading, but still not

98. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-523, 18 U.S.C. §§
3261 et seq. (2000).
99. 18 U.S.C. § 3261(a) (2007). See also DEP'T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION 5525.11, CRIMINAL
JURISDICTION OVER CIVILIANS EMPLOYED By OR ACCOMPANYING THE ARMED FORCES
OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES, CERTAIN SERVICE MEMBERS, AND FORMER SERVICE MEMBERS §
6.1 (2005).
100. Article 19 of CAT requires that State parties submit an initial report on measures taken at
the national level to implement obligations under CAT to the Committee Against Torture within
the first year of entry into force. Convention Against Torture, supra note 90, at art. 19. In its
2005 Report to the Committee, a Canadian official declared that Canada's Criminal Code
contains "robust anti-torture laws." Committee Against Torture, Presentation of Canada's Fourth
(May
4,
2005),
http://www.dfait-aeci.gc.ca/canada un/geneva/
and
Fifth Reports
canreports com-en.asp. In 2007, Italy, the Netherlands, and Ukraine submitted reports averring
that torture was prohibited under their respective national laws. See Press Release, Committee
available at
Against Torture Concludes Thirty-Eighth Session (May 18, 2007),
http://www.unog.ch/unog/website/news-media.nsf/(httpNewsByYear-en)/
29F1BA9E6E6E34FAC 12572DF004208C7?OpenDocument.
101. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, The Reality ofJus Cogens, 7 CONN. J. INT'L L. 81, 81 (1991);
M. Cherif Bassiouni, InternationalCrimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 68 (1996) (naming, inter alia, torture, genocide, and slavery as
international crimes that are jus cogens); Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law:
Jurisprudencefor the White House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1711 (2005) (torture is jus
cogens); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
702 cmt. n. See also In re Estate of Marcos, 978 F.2d 493, 500 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Siderman
de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715, 717 (9th Cir. 1992) (acknowledging that official acts of
torture are now widely recognized as jus cogens violations)).
102. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel,
Department of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes
II, Gen. Counsel for the Department of Defense (Jan. 22, 2002) available at
http://www.americantorture.com/documents/torturememos/I 0.pdf [hereinafter Bybee Memo].
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produce pain and suffering of the requisite intensity to fall within Section
2340A's proscription against torture."' 3 The remainder of the memo
explains how such a parsing, between torture and "cruel, inhuman, or
degrading" acts, or between torture and "torture lite" is legally
defensible."~ Bybee argued the prohibition against torture was limited to
"extreme, deliberate, and unusually cruel practices.""'o° He reasoned the
physical or mental pain attending the predicate act "must be of such a high
level of intensity that the pain is difficult for the subject to endure.""1 6
By requiring proof of corporeal impact upon a victim, Bybee
eviscerated the CAT's clear prohibition against psychological torture.0 7
With these definitions as his baseline, Bybee concluded interrogators who
used certain techniques to obtain intelligence from detainees likely would
not be subject to criminal prosecution under the U.S. Code.'
According
to Bybee's logic, to qualify as torture, the interrogator must specifically
intend to commit not only the prohibited act, but also the consequence of
that act.'0 9 In other words, Bybee reasoned an interrogator could perform
actions approximating torture, but escape prosecution as long as he did not
specifically intend to cause the victim prolonged mental harm. Moreover,
to qualify as "prolonged," the mental harm must be "endured over some
period of time," not limited to the period of interrogation itself."0 In sum,
Bybee's memo concluded that the standard of proof for prosecuting
interrogators for violations of U.S. laws prohibiting torture would be very
high indeed.

103. Id.at 1.
104. See Seth F. Kreimer, "Torture Lite, " "FullBodied" Torture, and the Insulation of Legal

Conscience, 1 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 187, 224 (2005). Professor Kreimer explains the
difference between torture, "in which physical assaults on the body of the victim result in
excruciating pain," and "torture lite" techniques which "involve the infliction of severe physical
or psychological stress by means other than physical assault." Id. at 188 n.3. Sleep deprivation,
stress and duress positions, physical isolation, and subjection to loud noises or very bright lights
are all examples of "torture lite" techniques. Id.
105. Bybee Memo, supra note 102, at 28-29 (relying on the European Court of Human
Right's decision in Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 25 (1978), which held that while
interrogation techniques such as wall standing, hooding, use of loud noise, sleep deprivation, and
deprivation of food and drink were inhumane and degrading, they did not amount to torture).
106. See id.
at5.
107. Convention Against Torture, supra note 90, at art. 1(1).
108. Bybee Memo, supra note 102, at 46.
109. See id. at 3 (reasoning "because Section 2340 requires a defendant act with specific
intent to inflict severe pain, the infliction of such pain must be the defendant's precise objective").
110. Id.
at 7.
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While the ban on torture in domestic and international law is absolute,
lawyers working for the U.S. Government searched for a legal loophole.11'
This type of overly legalistic approach to real-life interrogation situations
proved to be disastrous in the field. In essence, interrogators without legal
educations were left to determine, on their own, what techniques were
permissible and which were prohibited. Observers have linked the abuses
at Abu Ghraib prison, for example, to poor leadership and lack of specific
regulations for interrogations, beginning at the top levels of government,
and with the Bybee memo in particular." 2
The Bush Administration's splitting-hairs approach leads down a
slippery slope, posing the problem some CIA officials unofficially term
"the disposal plan.""'
At the bottom of that slope, Professor McCoy
asserts, "is a chasm . . . called extrajudicial execution.""' 4 Stated
differently, when CIA interrogators subject high value detainees to
treatment that stops short of "extreme, deliberate, and unusually cruel
practices" in order to extract intelligence information, the detainees become
"tainted for trial.""' At this stage, the temptation to dispose of the detainee
through summary execution is great because, besides having destroyed any
chance for prosecuting the detainee, interrogators fear their treatment of the
detainee will make themselves vulnerable to future criminal prosecution
under federal torture statutes." 6 A living survivor of the interrogation,
after all, is a potential witness. More pointedly, Tyler Drumheller, former
chief of European operations at the CIA explains: "What are you going to
do with these people? The utility of someone like K.S.M. is, at most, six
11. See MCCOY, supra note 88, at 112-13. McCoy also describes various memos penned for
the Executive by David S. Addington, John Yoo, Alberto Gonzales, and Jay Bybee that
effectively allowed the CIA to use torture when interrogating suspected members of al Qaeda and
the Taliban. Id. at 112-16.
112.

See, e.g., Marcy Strauss, The Lessons of Abu Ghraib, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1269, 1280-81,

85 (2005). See also Richard B. Schmitt, Justice Adopts Revised View of Torture Definition, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 1, 2005, at A31 (explaining the role of Alberto Gonzales in the Justice Department
memo allowing for torture of suspects detained by the military); David Johnston & James Risen,
The Reach of War: The Interrogations;Aides Say memo Backed Coercionfor Qaeda Cases, N.Y.

TIMES, Jun. 27, 2004, at 11 (providing a full account of the Justice Department's memo).
113. Mayer, supra note 2. "In the Vietnam War, the CIA ... avoid[ed] the formalities of
prosecution with pump and dump-pumping suspects for information by torture and then
dumping the bodies." MCCOY, supra note 88, at 119.
114. MCCOY, supra note 88, at 195.
115. Id. Memorandum from the Office of the Assistant Attorney Gen. on Legal Standards
Applicable under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to Deputy Attorney Gen. James B. Comey (Dec. 30,

2004) (on file with author).
116. Mayer, supra note 2. Some CIA agents have reportedly purchased professional liability
insurance policies to assist with potential legal fees. Id. As discussed in Part II.C., perpetrators

of torture are subject to both criminal prosecution and civil lawsuits. See infra Part II.C.
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months to a year. You exhaust them. Then what? It would have been
better if we had executed them.""' But effective alternatives to torture
exist.
Before the Executive turned control over interrogations to the CIA,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") had been running quite a
successful counterintelligence program in Afghanistan." 8 Under strict
orders to "work by the book," FBI agents used empathetic, non-coercive
tactics to encourage terror suspects to talk." 9 These techniques, which
included building trust and rapport with the detainees rather than fear and
loathing, produced solid, actionable intelligence. 2 0 In stark contrast, when
CIA or military interrogators using harsh techniques took over from the
FBI, "the detainee would stop being cooperative."''
Using torturous methods to interrogate suspects for either intelligence
or evidence is illegal and immoral.'
Moreover, torturing suspects is
counterproductive. 23 Torture does not lead to credible information which
can be used to rout the terrorist threat;'24 and allegations of U.S. sponsored
torture practices potentially can lead to the radicalization of new
generations of terrorists.' 25 If bringing terrorists to justice is indeed a
paramount objective, in order to accomplish that objective, prosecutors
need evidence clean of the taint of torture.
III. TERROR SUSPECTS SHOULD BE TRIED IN THE NORMAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
The military commission system has failed, but inventing an ad hoc
terrorist court will not repair the damage done by President Bush's failed

117. Mayer, supra note 2.
118. See MCCOY, supra note 88, at 118.
119. Id. Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") agent Jack Cloonan specifically instructed
his operatives in Kabul to use interrogation techniques "that would allow later prosecution." Id.
120. Id. at 118-19.
121. Id. at 159. FBI agent Dan Coleman succinctly observed: "Brutalization doesn't work.
We know that. Besides, you lose your soul." Id. at 203.
122. Amos N. Guiora & Erin M. Page, The Unholy Trinity: Intelligence, Interrogation, and
Torture, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 427, 429 (2006).
123. Anne Applebaum, Torture is Counterproductive, SLATE, March 20, 2007,
http://slate.com/id/2162211/.
124. See Guiora & Page, supra note 122, at 429. See also Mayer, supra note 2 (quoting a
former top CIA official who estimated that "ninety percent of the information [obtained through
the CIA's interrogation and detention program] was unreliable").
125. See, e.g., MCCOY, supra note 88, at 201. A former MI5 agent is quoted as stating that
the British approach to containing IRA terrorists had the paradoxical effect of creating even more
terrorists. Id. "It did nothing but exacerbate the situation. Most of those interned went back to
terrorism. You'll end up radicalizing the entire population." Id.
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experiment. In order to win support for the United State's war effort, the
trials of suspected terrorists must be viewed as legitimate and fair by both
the domestic and international community. Thus, the urgent need to try
and punish terrorists efficiently must be tempered with the obligation to do
so in accordance with the established rule of law. Any criminal tribunal
used to try terror suspects must provide the accused with due process rights
acknowledged internationally. However, the Bush Administration's quest
to bring terrorists to justice has been haunted by the specter 126of
inappropriately coercive interrogation methods "tantamount to torture."'
It is beyond debate that using torture to elicit either intelligence
information or confessions of criminal activity is illegal under both U.S.
and international law. 127
Federal district courts, unlike military
commissions or the proposed ad hoc national security court, have
developed a sophisticated jurisprudence which imposes a harsh penalty on
the Government for violations of the prohibition against torture, namely the
exclusion of evidence tainted by illegal interrogation practices. 218 For these
reasons, U.S. district courts are the most appropriate venues to bring
suspects accused of terrorism offenses to justice.
At the outset, it is important to acknowledge federal district courts
successfully have prosecuted terrorists in the past using established
mechanisms that balance the Government's national security interests with
the due process rights of the accused. 129 Unlike the military commissions
or the proposed terrorist court, whose procedures are untested, the district
courts have an established record of completed prosecutions.13
The
perpetrators of the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center,131 including
later, Ramzi Yousef; 132 the perpetrators of the 1995 bombing of the

126. INT'L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF
THE RED CROSS ON THE TREATMENT BY THE COALITION FORCES OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND
OTHER PROTECTED PERSONS BY THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS IN IRAQ DURING ARREST,
INTERNMENT, AND INTERROGATION, 4 (Feb. 2004), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/library/report/2004/icrcreportiraqjfeb2004.pdf [hereinafter ICRC Report].
127. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 90, at art. 2; See generally Resolution of
Advice and Consent to Ratification, S. Exec. Rep. No. 101-30 (1990); 18 U.S.C. §2340.
128. See infra. Part II.A.-II.B.
129. See United States v. Bin Laden, 58 F. Supp. 2d 113, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); United States
v. Al-Arian, 267 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1267 (M.D. Fla. 2003).
130. Lucy Martinez, ProsecutingTerrorists at the InternationalCriminal Court: Possibilities
and Problems, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 52 (2002).
13 1. James McKinley, Jr., The Terror Conspiracy: The Verdict: Mountains of Evidence, But
Questions Remain, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1995, at B5. Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman and nine others
were convicted of conspiracy to commit terrorist acts. Id.
132. Christopher S. Wren, Verdicts in Terror Trial: The Overview: U.S. Jury Convicts 3 in a
Conspiracyto Bomb Airlines, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1996, at At. Judge Kevin Duffy of the U.S.
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Oklahoma City federal building; 13 3 the perpetrators of the 1998 bombing of
the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania; 134 and the "twentieth" 9/11
terrorist, Zacarias Moussaoui, 131 have all been tried and convicted using
normal criminal procedures in U.S. district courts. In August 2007, as this
Essay was being written, the jury in the federal trial of the alleged "dirty
bomber," Jose Padilla,136 returned a guilty verdict.' 37 Certainly, the
13
criminal trials of accused terrorists have suffered logistical difficulties, 1

District Court for the Southern District of New York sentenced Yousef to 240 years for his part in
the 1993 World Trade Center bombings and life in prison for the 1994 bombing of a Philippine
Airlines jet that killed one person. Id.
133. Jo Thomas, The Oklahoma City Bombing: The Verdict: McVeigh Jury Decides on
Sentence of Death in Oklahoma Bombing, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1997, at 1-1. Timothy McVeigh,
a U.S. Army veteran of Operation Desert Storm, was sentenced to death for his part in the
Oklahoma City bombing. Id. His co-conspirator, Terry Nichols, was convicted in federal court
of conspiracy to bomb a federal building, eight counts of involuntary manslaughter, and was
sentenced to life in prison. Jo Thomas, Terry Nichols Gets Life Term Bombing Plot,N.Y. TIMES,
June 5, 1998, at Al. Jurors in Nichols's Oklahoma state criminal trial convicted him of 161
counts of murder. Id. He was sentenced to life in prison in that case. Associated Press, Hung
Jury Spares Nichols a 2nd Time From Death, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2004, at A7.
134. Benjamin Weiser, Trial Poked Holes in Image of Bin Laden's Terror Group, N.Y.
TIMES, May 31, 2001, at Al. In October 2001, four associates of Osama Bin Laden were
convicted and sentenced to life in prison. Id. Bin Laden was also named in the indictment. Id.
135. See generally United States v. Moussaoui, 483 F.3d 220 (2007); See also Jerry Markon
& Timothy Dwyer, Jurors Reject Death Penaltyfor Moussaoui, WASH. POST, May 4, 2006, at
Al.
136. Eric Lichtblau, Threats and Responses: The Padilla Case: In Legal Shift, U.S. Charges
Detainee in Terrorism Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2005, at Al. For three years, Jose Padilla was
held in U.S. military custody without charges as an enemy combatant on suspicion of plotting to
detonate a "dirty bomb." Id. In 2005, the Justice Department named Padilla as a co-defendant in
a case already on the docket in the federal district court in Miami. Id. Padilla and his codefendants were charged with conspiracy to murder U.S. nationals, conspiracy to provide material
support to terrorism, and providing material support to terrorism. Id. The charges did not include
any allegations regarding the dirty bomb. Id.
137. Peter Whoriskey, Jury Convicts Jose Padilla of Terror Charges, WASH. POST, Aug. 17,
2007, at Al (noting: "The conviction essentially accomplishes through the criminal-court system
what the administration had tried to do five years ago by executive fiat").
138. Threats to judge, jury, and general public safety are among the conceivable dangers
related to hosting civilian criminal trials of accused terrorists. See John W. Dean, Thoughts on
the "Bringing Terrorists to Justice Act of 2006", Sept. 22, 2006, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/
dean/20060922.html. A commonly-raised objection to holding terrorist trials in U.S. district
courts is the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide defendants with discovery rights so
broad they could compromise sensitive intelligence information. For example, during the 1988
district court trial of Fawaz Yunis, Yunis's defense counsel asked for copies of all materials
related to the electronic surveillance of Yunis and a government informant, a discovery right
permitted by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See United States v. Yunis, 1988 WL
16302 (D.D.C. 1988). Yunis was accused of hijacking Royal Jordanian Airlines flight 402.
United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 618 (D.C. Cir. 1989). A joint task force of the CIA, FBI,
and Defense Department succeeded in luring Yunis onto a boat and arrested him in international
waters. Id. at 119. The Government argued the threat to classified information posed by release
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but they also have withstood the scrutiny the legal community has reserved
for proceedings under a military tribunal system. 139
A. EVOLUTION OF THE LEGAL DOCTRINE EXCLUDING COERCED
CONFESSIONS

The U.S. Supreme Court has managed, through a long history of cases
involving police interrogation practices, to strike a workable balance
between legitimate government needs to question criminals and due
process protections for the individuals subjected to such interrogations.
Courts in the United States inherited the English common law rule that
coerced confessions should not be admitted into evidence against the
accused because they were unreliable. 4 ' Courts also reasoned that forced
confessions should be excluded because they were involuntary.' 4 ' Over
time the separate rationales became somewhat entangled with each other,
and courts continued to exclude coerced confessions because they were
inherently untrustworthy, often conflating this with the voluntariness
test. 142
In the United States, the Supreme Court adopted the voluntariness
test 43 and the confusion regarding its underlying rationale that

of the requested records was too great and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held that a higher standard for discovery applied when a defendant seeks classified
information. Id. at 623.
139. As Professor Charles V. Pena observes, the U.S. Government publicly has expressed its
concern that military trials sometimes lack basic due process protections. Charles V. Pena,
Blowback: The Unintended Consequencesof Military Tribunals, 16 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS &

PUB. POL'Y 119, 123 (2002). In its annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, the U.S.
State Department has criticized Burma, Egypt, Sudan, and Peru, among other nations, for using
special military tribunals to try civilians. Id. at 123-25 (citing Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights & Labor, U.S. Dep't of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2000 (Feb. 23,
2001), availableat http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/).
140. Professor Wigmore insisted the privilege against self-incrimination was in place solely to
exclude unreliable evidence. See J.H. WIGMORE, TREATISE ON EVIDENCE §820 (2d ed. 1923).

141. Other commentators suggest that judicial recognition of the privilege was based in a
concern that criminal suspects should be protected from coerced confession or to prevent abusive
See WELSH S. WHITE, MIRANDA'S WANING PROTECTIONS: POLICE
police practices.
INTERROGATION PRACTICES AFTER DICKERSON 40 (2001) (citing Charles T. McCormick, Some
Problems and Developments in the Admissibility of Confessions, 24 TEX. L. REV. 239, 277
(1946); Monrad G. Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. REV.
431, 441 (1954); Francis Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil

Liberties,45 ILL. L. REV. 1,29 (1950)).
142. WHITE, supra note 142, at 39-40 (citing Scott's Case, 1 D&B 47, 58, 169 Eng. Rep. 909,
914 (1956)).
143. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 584 (1884); Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 549
(1897).
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accompanied it. In cases where interrogation tactics were challenged, the
Court reasoned that violence and threats by the police could result in
unreliable evidence.'" The end result of this rationale, however, was that
challenges to forced confessions were rejected if the Court was satisfied
'
that the confession was truthful. 45
Nevertheless, the Court continued to utilize the amorphous
voluntariness test throughout the Jim Crow period, during which white law
enforcement officials regularly used violence to force black suspects to
confess.146 In Brown v. Mississippi,147 the Court reversed the defendants'
convictions for murder, finding they "were void for want of the essential
elements of due process."'' 48 After learning of the murder, the local sheriff
and his posse approached Yank Ellington, one of the defendants, in his
home and accused him of the crime. 41 When Ellington denied his
involvement, the sheriffs posse
hanged him by a rope to the limb of a tree, and, having let him down,
they hung him again, and when he was let down the second time, and
he still protested his innocence, he was tied to a tree and whipped, and
still declining to accede to the demands that he confess, he was finally
released, and he returned50 with some difficulty to his home, suffering
intense pain and agony.'
Ellington's torment continued when the sheriffs deputy returned to
En route to the jail
Ellington's house two days later to arrest him.'
facility, the deputy drove through Alabama, stopped, and beat Ellington
At trial, Ellington and his
with a whip until he confessed to the murder.'
false
and obtained through
co-defendants argued their confessions were
"physical torture."' 53 Announcing "[i]t is difficult to conceive of methods
144. WHITE, supra note 142, at 42 (citing Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 192 (1953),
where the majority declared: "Reliance on a coerced confession... vitiates a conviction because
such a confession combines the persuasiveness of apparent conclusiveness with what judicial
experience shows to be illusive and deceptive evidence").
145. WHITE, supra note 142, at 42 (citing Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944) and Stein
v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953)).
146. See Amos N. Guiora, Interrogation of Detainees: Extending a Hand or a Boot?, 41 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM (forthcoming 2008) (comparing the second-class citizens status of African
Americans in "the Deep South" to the alien enemy combatant status assigned to detainees at
Guantandmo).
147. 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1936).
148. Id. at 287.
149. Id. at 281.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 281-82.
153. Brown, 297 U.S. at 279. The murder, indictment, trial, conviction, and sentence in this
case all occurred within a week's time. Id.
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more revolting to the sense of justice than those taken to procure the
confessions of these petitioners[,]"' 54 the Court determined the confessions
55
were both untrustworthy and involuntary, and reversed the conviction. 1
The Court's 1961 ruling in Rogers v. Richmond marked the Court's
attempt to construct a due process analysis, eliminating the truthfulness
inquiry. 156 Unlike Brown, in Rogers, there was no allegation the defendant
had been subject to any physical violence, but the Court's concern about
the coercive nature police interrogations animates its reasoning and holding
here.' 57 Rogers confessed to killing the victim of a liquor store robbery
only after the local chief of police threatened to take Roger's wife into
custody.' 58 During his trial, Rogers testified he had confessed to spare his
arthritic wife the pain of being transported by the police. 5 9 The Court
ordered Rogers be discharged because the state trial court applied the
wrong test in determining whether Rogers's due process rights had been
violated. 160 The trial judge ruled Rogers's confession was "freely and
voluntarily made," basing this determination solely on the probable
veracity of the confession itself. 6' In other words, the trial court weighed
the likelihood of the substantive truth of Rogers's confession as the only
factor in determining its voluntariness. 162 The Court held the truth or
falsity of Rogers's confession had no place in a due process inquiry.163 The
Court explained under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, coerced confessions could not be the bases for criminal
convictions." This was
not because such confessions are unlikely to be true but because the
methods used to extract them offend an underlying principle in the

enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an
inquisitorial system-a system in which the State must establish guilt
by evidence independently and freely secured and may not65by coercion
prove its charge against an accused out of his own mouth. 1

154. Id. at 286.
155. Id. at 287 (noting that, besides the confession, there was no other evidence tying the
defendant to the crime).
156. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1961).
157. Id. at 535.
158. Id. at 535-36.
159. Id. at 536.
160. Id. at 540.
161. Id. at 541-42.
162. Rogers, 365 U.S. at 542.
163. Id. at 543-44.
164. Id. at 544-45.
165. Id. at 540-41.
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Instead of evaluating the truth of the confession, the Supreme Court held
the trial judge should have inquired whether the police chief's actions
broke Rogers's will to resist. 166
The Court's effort to find a judicial solution to the widespread
problem of abusive police interrogation has been well-chronicled. 167 The
voluntariness test announced in Rogers, however, did not satisfy the
Court's desire to curb police abuses because this fact-dependent inquiry
allowed trial court judges to make factual findings that limited the Court's
ability to determine voluntariness on appellate review. 168 Therefore, in its
1966 decision in Miranda v. Arizona, the Court announced a rule
simultaneously eliminating the fact-specific determinations of its previous
Fifth Amendment due process jurisprudence, and provided clear guidelines
for future interrogations by law enforcement. 169
B. MIRANDA AND THE PUBLIC SAFETY EXCEPTION
In Miranda,the Court decided the prohibition against coercive police
interrogation practices and the right against self-incrimination had a firm
constitutional basis in the Fifth Amendment.' 70 The Court ruled the police
must, prior to interrogation, inform a person in custody of her right to
remain silent, her right to legal counsel, and her right to court-appointed
counsel if she is indigent."'7 In its decision, the Miranda court specifically
announced its disapproval of methods of brutality ("beatings, hanging,
whipping") used by the police to force suspects to confess.' 72 Rejecting its
previous totality of the circumstances approach, the Court explained:
The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of
constitutional law and the expedient of giving an adequate warning as
to the applicability of the privilege so simple, we will not pause to
inquire in individual cases whether the
73 defendant was aware of his
rights without a warning being given. 1
In other words, if police do not give the required warnings, courts
would close their ears to prosecution arguments that the defendant

166. Id. at 544.
167. See e.g., WHITE, supra note 142.
168. Id. at40-41.
169. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-479 (1966).
170. Id. at 467. See also United States v. Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) (affirming in
Miranda, the Court had pronounced a constitutional rule).
171. Miranda,384 U.S. at479.
172. Id. at 445-46 (citing, inter alia, Nat'l Comm'n on Law Observance and Enforcement,
Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement (1931)).
173. Id. at 468.
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somehow knew of these rights. 7 4 Rather, courts faced with future unwarned confessions would simply exclude such evidence from the
prosecution's case-in-chief.
That the Miranda court sought a long-term solution to the problem of
police brutality is evident in its opinion. As the Court reasoned: "Unless a
proper limitation upon custodial interrogation is achieved-such as [this]
decision[] will advance-there can be no assurance that practices of this
nature will be eradicated in the foreseeable future."' 75 Using torture to
force suspected terrorists to provide information is no less shocking than
police brutality, yet, if proponents of a new ad hoc national security court
prevail, Miranda'spromise to protect against government violations of this
kind will go unfulfilled.
National security court advocates argue it is too burdensome on the
Government to make domestic due process rights available to terror
suspects when they are detained during a combat situation. 7 6 For example,
Professors Goldsmith and Katyal assert: "Detainees ... need not be given
the full panoply of criminal protections . . . . A terrorist captured in
Afghanistan should not be able to seek release because he was not read his
Miranda rights."' 7 7 The sensible argument implied here is requiring
soldiers on the battlefield to provide a list of rights to a captured enemy
combatant is overly burdensome.
However, the prerequisites for
admissibility under Miranda are not so inflexible to be unworkable in the
War on Terror.
Although the warning rule in Miranda is constitutionally-based, the
Court has recognized several exceptions to its strictures, including a narrow
exception for public safety.' 78 In New York v. Quarles,'7 9 police pursued a
rape suspect, who according to the victim was armed with a gun, into a
supermarket. '
The arresting officer drew his service revolver as he

174. See id. at468-69.
175. Id. at 447.
176. See Goldsmith & Katyal, supra note 19.
177. Id.
178. See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (allowing the prosecution to use
unwarned statements to impeach the testimony of a criminal defendant who chose to testify);
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450-52 (1974) (declining to apply the exclusionary rule from
Miranda retroactively); Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714, 722 (1975) (allowing the prosecution to
use statements elicited in violation of Miranda to impeach the defendant who chose to testify);
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985) (recognizing a subsequent administration of Miranda
warnings could cure a confession derived from an earlier unwarned statement).
179. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
180. Id. at 651-52.
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approached the suspect and ordered him to stop.'
The suspect complied,
but while he was frisking him, the officer saw the suspect's gun holster was
empty. 8 2 The officer handcuffed the suspect and asked him about the
location of the gun.183 The suspect indicated with a nod of his head and
said, "the gun is over there."' 84 Only after pausing to retrieve the gun did
the officer read the suspect his Miranda rights.8 5 The trial court
suppressed the defendant's in-custody statement about the location of his
gun and the gun itself because the statement was obtained before the
arresting officer read him his Miranda rights. 8 6 The Supreme Court
reversed, holding the defendant's pre-warning statement and the gun itself
were admissible because of "the immediate necessity" to secure the safety
of the location. 87
'
The public safety exception under Quarles would certainly apply in
circumstances, like those described by Professors Goldsmith and Katyal
above, when capturing a suspect on the battlefield might not provide a safe
opportunity for a recitation of rights.'8 8 Under Quarles, the duty to inform
a terror suspect of his rights hypothetically can be delayed until military
forces have secured the safety of the location. Then, as FBI agents working
in counterintelligence have done for decades, the suspect can be warned
and lawful interrogation can commence.' 89
Using the Miranda case as a base upon which to create guidelines on
interrogation practices in the battlefield will promote several goals. First, it
will provide detailed instructions to guards and interrogators on the proper
treatment of detainees. By reorienting the mindset of interrogators, the
Government will benefit by receiving admissible evidence to use in
criminal cases against suspected terrorists. Second, confessions and other
evidence that lack a high indicia of reliability will be excluded. As
previously discussed, information gleaned from suspected terrorists using
practices "tantamount to torture" does not yield reliable information. 9°

181.
182.

Id.at 652.
Id.

183. Id.
184. Id.
185.

Quarles, 467 U.S. at 652.

186. Id. at 651.
187. Id. at650.
188.

Id. at 655-56.

189. See MCCOY, supra note 88, at 203.
190. See infra at Part II.C. "'The torture
information being extracted,' reports James
General Staff College. 'The abusers couldn't
because in the end there was nothing to show

of suspects did not lead to any useful intelligence
Corum, a professor at the Army Command and
even use the old 'ends justify the means' argument,
but a tremendous propaganda defeat for the United
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Under threats of physical and/or psychological violence from his captor, a
suspect will "say almost anything" to end the interrogation session.'
Thus, using veracity as the sole test for admissibility is unworkable from a
due process standpoint as long as trial courts can admit forced confessions
if the confessions are deemed truthful. Therefore, as the Supreme Court
announced in Rogers and Miranda, forced confessions should be excluded
from evidence presented at a criminal trial because government coercion
constitutes a violation of the accused's due process rights.' 92 Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, by guaranteeing even those accused of the most
heinous crimes will be accorded due process rights, the United States will
satisfy the demand for fair and legitimate trials.
IV. CONCLUSION
In its landmark Miranda decision, the Supreme Court announced
confessions obtained by the police would be excluded from trial unless the
criminal defendant had been warned of certain constitutional rights prior to
questioning. Miranda was the culmination of years of efforts by the Court
to curb abuses of police power.
The social issues confronted by the Miranda court-abusive police
interrogation, procedural protections for criminal defendants, and the
legitimacy of the legal system in which these issues are tried-are as
relevant in today's Age of Terror as they were at the time of the Supreme
Court's decision in 1966. The CIA currently is engaged in an interrogation
and detention program of suspected terrorists that relies on torture to
extract intelligence information. However, rather than easing regulations
on interrogations by creating an ad hoc national security court with special
admissibility rules, the United States should treat alleged terrorists as
criminals and prosecute them in the federal courts. The exclusionary rule
announced fifty years ago in Miranda should be applied in the criminal
trials of accused terrorists. Doing so would satisfy international demands
for fair trials and could also lead to the eventual abolition of torture as an
interrogation method.

MCCOY, supra note 88, at 196 (citing Stephen Budiansky, Intelligence: Truth
States."'
Extraction, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 2005, at 32-35).
191. Peter Brookes, The Torture Test, Nov. 7, 2005, http://www.heritage.org/Press/
Commentary/edl 10705d.cfm (concluding harsh interrogation techniques actually hinder efforts to
obtain actionable intelligence because detainees will often "say almost anything to get the
interrogator to stop the torture/humiliation"). See also Ariel Dorfnan, Are We Really So
Fearful?, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 2006, at B1; Scott Shane & Mark Mazzetti, Advisers Fault
Harsh Methods in Interrogation,N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2007, at Al.
192. See Rogers, 365 U.S. at 540; see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 462.
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